The attacks on Paris have raised the profile of ISIS in
western thinking, and the gut response by France has been to increase its
bombing of areas of Syria under the control of the violent jihadi semi-state.
Two months ago the Syrian crisis was being seen through the lens of the
hundreds of thousands of refugees seeking to escape from the continuing
violence in Syria. It is really important to work out a strategy to deal with
both the humanitarian crisis in Syria, and the jihadi threat across the region
and elsewhere.
Although I am mostly concerned with Syria, it is important
to remember that the crisis affects a number of other countries. Iraq is where
ISIS was created, a direct result of gross incompetence by the USA led
destruction of the country in 2003, and ISIS is mainly Iraqi led and holds a
significant area of Iraqi soil. Turkey has been a major conduit of both
personnel and general trade into the ISIS area, and in general part of the
Turkish state is not particularly opposed to ISIS, allowing over the years
significant support, and there are many ISIS sleeper cells now in Turkey. Also
the Turkish anti-Kurdish campaign over the last six months has distracted it
from dealing with ISIS and also attempted (and failed) to distract the generally
effective pan-Kurdish offensive against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria. Lebanon’s
Shia fighters of the Hezbollah party have been significant in supporting the
Syrian government with Iranian backing, and of course recently Russia has been
heavily involved in bombing areas of Syria, often civilian areas with no rebel
presence, but also mainly non-ISIS rebels (some of whom are of the Al-Qaeda
linked Nusra Front), while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Gulf countries have
been supporting non-ISIS rebels, and individuals there have been supporting
ISIS. As well as these, NATO countries, such as USA< France and UK have been
involved in covert, supportive and air operations against ISIS and to some
extent the Syrian government.
The post-Paris
narrative has been one concerned with dealing with ISIS. Although this group
has called for local attacks in the West, it is not clear how much its
leadership in the Middle East knew about the plans or had any direct
involvement. It encourages both lone-wolf attacks and gives training to
suicide-bombers and terrorists in the sort of attacks which happened in Beirut,
Paris and Bamako. Clearly ISIS is a problem, and probably the source of these
attacks. But the reason ISIS exists is the failure of firstly the Iraqi
government to govern well, and then of the Syrian. Sleeper cells in Mosul
preached against the corruption and incompetence of the Iraqi government, and
when they helped the ISIS takeover ran the public services much better. Later
the level of oppression and submission required by the ISIS leadership in Mosul
began to rankle, but it was clear that to begin with life under ISIS was better
than under the chaotic government. To rid the world of ISIS means ensuring good
governance.
ISIS in Syria exists because of the Syrian government,
headed by Bashar al-Asad. It is a sectarian, kleptocratic regime which has
managed to divide the Syrian people into sects with its actions and propaganda.
Nearly all the refugees fleeing Syria say they are fleeing the government and
its torture, rape and bombing. Very few flee ISIS in comparison. ISIS does not
control the heavily populated west and north. By ending not only the rule of
Bashar al-Asad, but the whole system under which he has headed the destruction
of the country, the main reason for ISIS’ existence in Syria would disappear.
If western governments wish to rid themselves of the fear of
ISIS, then the Syrian government needs to change.
Syria’s infrastructure has been badly destroyed by the
different parties since the popular uprising was turned into a violent conflict
by the government. Not only have ancient sites, like the Omayyad Mosque and Suq
in Aleppo, or the ruins of Palmyra, been badly damaged, but hospitals, schools,
factories and power generating facilities. The Russian bombing (mainly non-ISIS
rebels) has added considerably to this, and has had widespread human cost too.
The USA led of ISIS areas bombing seems to have been relatively limited,
probably in an attempt to avoid the deaths of innocent civilians. Since France
increased its bombing following the Paris attacks, it has been noticed that the
number of civilian casualties have risen. This is significant and worrying.
ISIS has large numbers of people in its towns and villages.
Its own fighters in general are not Syrian, with its leadership mainly being
Iraqi, and huge numbers of fighters from many countries and backgrounds.
Careful targeting in the USA led strikes has been an attempt to kill ISIS
leaders and not the local population who have no say in the government of their
areas. There are real difficulties in who to target. Many rural and urban
Syrians in the ISIS area are very poor. ISIS has gained some support with high
levels of pay with wide benefits for its members. It also encourages
significant trade in a variety of products, from stolen antiquities to oil, and
this trade is run by local Syrians who are taxed on their income. If there is
an increase of attacks on traffic of oil, for instance, it will be through the
targeting of poor local Syrians. They are scraping a living, feeding their
families in a traumatically difficult situation. To bomb them would make a
slight dent in the income of ISIS (95% of ISIS revenue is through local
taxation), but at huge cost to poor Syrian families, pushing them towards being
supporters of ISIS. If there must be bombing it needs to be carefully targeted,
and this is becoming harder as ISIS leaders and fighters seem to have moved
from Raqqa or to have moved to civilian areas in a typical human-shield mode.
ISIS continues to trade through Turkey. This is not the time to discuss the Turk/Kurd
issue, but the Turkish government has been working hard to prevent further
Kurdish expansion in Syria. At present there are significant Kurdish populations
south of the Turkish border in an area just north of Aleppo, and then in a much
larger area along most of the east of the border in the Qamishly and Hassake
area, known as Rojava in Kurdish, or the Jezireh in Arabic. At present the
Kurds have been successful in expelling ISIS from much of the Kurdish
territories in Syria and Iraq. They have used local Christian and Arab allies
in this, but are at the limit of their own area and it is not reasonable for
them to move further, even though linking their east and west territories would
suit other parties. It needs to be stressed too that alliances are pragmatic.
Christians tend to be pro-regime, and there are occasional tensions between
Arabs and Kurds fuelled by propaganda. The ISIS area on the Turkish border has
been a consistently busy area of trade, with support from many Turks on either
religious or financial grounds. For ISIS to be defeated this is probably the
most important key. Turkey is ambivalent both as a nation and as a government.
Erdoğan’s policy of quiet support for Sunni extremists is foolish, as his
attempt to be the leader of the Sunni world (as it seems) is absolutely in
conflict with ISIS’ apocalyptic vision of its own Caliphate. If ISIS is left to
grow it will activate its many sleeper cells among the very conservative Sunni
Turks along the border and become a challenge to Turkey’s existence. But
Erdoğan’s obsession with humiliating the Kurdish population of the east is
encouraging growing discontent with Turkish governance at a time Erdoğan needs
national unity to deal with the threat on the southern border.
Syria is suffering. It has been bombed, shot and shelled
into a ruin. What is needed is to stop the flow of arms and to gather all the
interested parties to end the fighting. It may be that some carefully targetted
bombing is necessary, but increasing bombing of ISIS territory with the
associated civilian suffering will result in further refugees fleeing Syria and
an increase in support for ISIS. Neither of these will resolve the problems
faced in Europe, let alone the suffering of the Syrian people.
