Until 2007, Syria stood out for its
successful food policy. Improvements in dry land farming achieved through
international assistance, state subsidies and centralized economic planning
made the country self-sufficient in strategic products such as wheat. [i]
One of the contributing factors to the rebellion against the
Syrian government was its disastrous economic policy, when Syria moved from an
old-style Socialist model to an incompetently managed, corruptly administered economic
liberalization. When faced with five years of severe drought the government was
unable and unwilling to intervene when poor harvests and high production costs
devastated the Syrian countryside. The rebellion consequently began in the
country, starting in Dera’a and spreading to Raqqa and Hasaka which had
suffered so badly.
Food, and in particular the supply of Arab bread, was a
contributing factor and became a tool of war, first by the Syrian government
and then by various opposition groups.
To begin with the army attacked food stocks, livestock and
agricultural machinery, as well as irrigation systems so that by the end of
2014 Syria’s wheat production was 52% below the pre-rebellion average.
The next tactic was attacks on bakeries. For instance in the
period from August 2012 to January 2013 there were 80 attacks on bakeries in
rebel held areas of Aleppo.[ii]
There are stories of besieged towns receiving flour and when the bakery opens,
for the bakery to be shelled, with significant human loss.
The Syrian government then attacked
the crops as they grew. Different news sources report the burning of fields in
Deir ez-Zor, Hama, Homs and in the oasis (the Ghouta) of Damascus.
It is not only the Syrian
government which has perpetrated these crimes. ISIS took control of the
Siyassiyah bridge into Deir ez-Zor which cut imports into government areas and
caused process to rise dramatically.
With publicity from Madaya, the
tactic of siege has come to public attention recently. This is no new policy.
The Palestinian area of Yarmouk in the suburbs of Damascus underwent a dramatic
siege. A busy residential area of about 160,000 people, it was the scene of
inter-factional fighting early in the unrest when pro-government militants
killed 14 protesters. FSA forces supported the anti-government Palestinians in
December 2012 and expelled loyalist Palestinians from the PFLP. Yarmouk became
a solidly anti-government area in Damascus, and the base for rocket attacks
into the city. The government immediately surrounded the suburb and cut off
supplies. By February 2014 nearly 100 residents had died of starvation.[iii]
The rebels were forced by this into negotiations with the government and were
expelled. The government’s name for the operation was ’Starvation until
Submission.’ It is a medieval tactic without the clear medieval rules of war.
It is a policy aimed at breaking the will of the population in a rebel
controlled area, for we must remember that in all these urban battlegrounds the
residents have no say in who governs them. In Homs, for instance, scene of the
huge anti-government demonstrations at the beginning of the uprising, following
the siege, committed activists described the collapse of the will to rebel,
I was inside the siege until not long ago. As I see it, the departure
of the remaining young men from Homs will limit the revolution in liberated
areas. Frankly speaking, what I have seen
since leaving the siege is that Homs’s civilians have begun to distance
themselves from the revolutionary mind-set; they are now simply trying to live,
nothing more. This means that public support for the revolution in Homs is very weak.[iv]
A recent article by Martinez and Eng[v]
points to the complexity of the response to these various food-based policies. Although humanitarian organisations are
generally committed to neutrality, they are by their methods of bringing supplies
inadvertently supporting the government. In most cases food aid has to be
permitted through the Syrian government, or the Syrian Arab Red Crescent.
As it is, in general food supplied by UN agencies and other
programmes working to relieve starvation separate people who are in opposition
to the powerful (the opposition in government-controlled areas, pro-government
people in rebel areas) from the political situation. People are treated as
victims of an emergency (as though this were a natural and sudden catastrophe),
and the causes of their starvation are ignored. The agencies seek to alleviate
hunger, but can only do so by co-operating with the local powers.
The wartime government can
reduce expenditures on food distribution and other provisionary duties at the
heart of its prewar social pact with Syrian society, focusing its funds instead
on military efforts. This helps the Assad regime assuage popular discontent
that might otherwise translate into unrest. This prospect was made evident in
violent protests against fuel, food and electricity shortages in the
regime-controlled city of Latakia in late 2014.[vi]
While the government is essential to the UN functioning,
David Milliband is quoted by Martinez and Eng, as saying, ‘TheFood and War in Syria
Until 2007, Syria stood out for its
successful food policy. Improvements in dry land farming achieved through
international assistance, state subsidies and centralized economic planning
made the country self-sufficient in strategic products such as wheat. [i]
One of the contributing factors to the rebellion against the
Syrian government was its disastrous economic policy, when Syria moved from an
old-style Socialist model to an incompetently managed, corruptly administered economic
liberalization. When faced with five years of severe drought the government was
unable and unwilling to intervene when poor harvests and high production costs
devastated the Syrian countryside. The rebellion consequently began in the
country, starting in Dera’a and spreading to Raqqa and Hasaka which had
suffered so badly.
Food, and in particular the supply of Arab bread, was a
contributing factor and became a tool of war, first by the Syrian government
and then by various opposition groups.
To begin with the army attacked food stocks, livestock and
agricultural machinery, as well as irrigation systems so that by the end of
2014 Syria’s wheat production was 52% below the pre-rebellion average.
The next tactic was attacks on bakeries. For instance in the
period from August 2012 to January 2013 there were 80 attacks on bakeries in
rebel held areas of Aleppo.[ii]
There are stories of besieged towns receiving flour and when the bakery opens,
for the bakery to be shelled, with significant human loss.
The Syrian government then attacked
the crops as they grew. Different news sources report the burning of fields in
Deir ez-Zor, Hama, Homs and in the oasis (the Ghouta) of Damascus.
It is not only the Syrian
government which has perpetrated these crimes. ISIS took control of the
Siyassiyah bridge into Deir ez-Zor which cut imports into government areas and
caused process to rise dramatically.
With publicity from Madaya, the
tactic of siege has come to public attention recently. This is no new policy.
The Palestinian area of Yarmouk in the suburbs of Damascus underwent a dramatic
siege. A busy residential area of about 160,000 people, it was the scene of
inter-factional fighting early in the unrest when pro-government militants
killed 14 protesters. FSA forces supported the anti-government Palestinians in
December 2012 and expelled loyalist Palestinians from the PFLP. Yarmouk became
a solidly anti-government area in Damascus, and the base for rocket attacks
into the city. The government immediately surrounded the suburb and cut off
supplies. By February 2014 nearly 100 residents had died of starvation.[iii]
The rebels were forced by this into negotiations with the government and were
expelled. The government’s name for the operation was ’Starvation until
Submission.’ It is a medieval tactic without the clear medieval rules of war.
It is a policy aimed at breaking the will of the population in a rebel
controlled area, for we must remember that in all these urban battlegrounds the
residents have no say in who governs them. In Homs, for instance, scene of the
huge anti-government demonstrations at the beginning of the uprising, following
the siege, committed activists described the collapse of the will to rebel,
I was inside the siege until not long ago. As I see it, the departure
of the remaining young men from Homs will limit the revolution in liberated
areas. Frankly speaking, what I have seen
since leaving the siege is that Homs’s civilians have begun to distance
themselves from the revolutionary mind-set; they are now simply trying to live,
nothing more. This means that public support for the revolution in Homs is very weak.[iv]
A recent article by Martinez and Eng[v]
points to the complexity of the response to these various food-based policies. Although humanitarian organisations are
generally committed to neutrality, they are by their methods of bringing supplies
inadvertently supporting the government. In most cases food aid has to be
permitted through the Syrian government, or the Syrian Arab Red Crescent.
As it is, in general food supplied by UN agencies and other
programmes working to relieve starvation separate people who are in opposition
to the powerful (the opposition in government-controlled areas, pro-government
people in rebel areas) from the political situation. People are treated as
victims of an emergency (as though this were a natural and sudden catastrophe),
and the causes of their starvation are ignored. The agencies seek to alleviate
hunger, but can only do so by co-operating with the local powers.
The wartime government can
reduce expenditures on food distribution and other provisionary duties at the
heart of its prewar social pact with Syrian society, focusing its funds instead
on military efforts. This helps the Assad regime assuage popular discontent
that might otherwise translate into unrest. This prospect was made evident in
violent protests against fuel, food and electricity shortages in the
regime-controlled city of Latakia in late 2014.[vi]
While the government is essential to the UN functioning,
David Milliband is quoted by Martinez and Eng, as saying, ‘The Assad regime
can’t afford to kick the UN out of Damascus. The UN is feeding so many of
[Assad’s] own people.’[vii]
Innocent civilians, including those who supported the demonstrations of 2011,
fled to the government held coastal area in order to survive, and places like
Dera’a cannot receive IRC aid because the government will not permit it. In
Tartous, a government stronghold, there is a well-developed programme for the
relief of need, so that ‘neutral aid’ bolster’s the impression of the
government’s legitimacy, while the rebels are unable to feed their own, and see
their position eroded. There is no doubt that aid in the form of food supplies
is an effective weapon on the government’s side. For decades the Syrian
government has ensured acquiescence rather than loyalty.
Food is a complex issue in the Syrian conflict. Seen by
humanitarian organisations as politically neutral, it effectively undermines
all those seeking a just and equitable society; and unequal distribution means
that the powerful state uses food aid as a tool in ensuring acquiescence by the
war-weary population. The origins of the Arab Spring, of Syrian popular
discontent, of the rebellion and attempted revolution are of course the complex
and oppressive ways in which the Assads enforced popular acquiescence to their corrupt
kleptocratic and torturing rule. The very attempts to alleviate the hunger of
the population has been turned to the government’s advantage.
[i] Starvation, Submission and Survival Syria's War Through the Prism
of Food. Eng and Martinez Middle
East Report. Winter2014, Issue 273, p28-32. 5p.
[ii]
McClatchy January 21, 2013
[iii]
Daily Star, Feb 18, 2014
[v] The
unintended consequences of emergency food aid: neutrality, sovereignty and
politics in the Syrian civil war, 2012–15 Martinez
and Eng International Affairs January
2016, Volume 92, Number 1
- See more at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ia/unintended-consequences-emergency-food-aid-neutrality-sovereignty-and-politics-syrian#sthash.eldB5nbI.dpuf
[vi] Martinez and Eng 2016
[vii] Lynch,
‘UN’s fear of angering Assad’ FP 30 Dec 2014
